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Abstract 
 
Hilary Putnam (1965, 2005) has argued that from a realist perspective, 
quantum mechanics stands in need of an interpretation. Ironically, this 
hypothesis may appear vulnerable against arguments drawing on Putnam's own 
work. Nancy Cartwright (2005) has urged that his 1962 essay on the meaning 
of theoretical terms suggests that quantum mechanics needs no interpretation 
and thus stands in tension with his claim of three years later. She furthermore 
contends that this conflict should be resolved in favour of the earlier work, as 
quantum mechanics, like all successful theories, does not need an interpretation. 
The first part of this essay deflates both of these objections. The second part 
addresses and evaluates Putnam's own assessments of the main interpretative 
options available in 1965 and 2005. Although we may disagree on some 
aspects, his pessimistic conclusion will come out largely unscathed, and, in fact, 
enhanced. I will close by briefly stating the historical relevance of this work.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Quantum mechanics offers the deepest and most compellingly confirmed theory science has 
ever devised. Yet, without a doubt, it also continues to surprise, puzzle, indeed stupefy us to 
an unparalleled extent. It frustrates our most dearly held intuitions concerning the material 
constitution of our world and seemingly demands their radical reconstitution. At the heart of 
the challenge quantum mechanics poses to our intuitive conceptions—even if tutored by 
classical physics, and indeed by relativity theory—we find the so-called ‘measurement 
problem’ and the non-local connections apparently implied by the experimental 
disconfirmation of Bell’s inequality. The former concerns the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics itself, i.e., the question of what precisely the theory claims to be the case in our 
world; the latter strains the theory’s relationship to another highly successful theory of 
physics, special relativity. Throughout his career, Hilary Putnam has reflected upon the 
foundations of quantum mechanics, particularly addressing the measurement problem and its 
ramifications.1 
                                                
1 Without making some valiant, but vain, attempt at being comprehensive here, 
the reader would be well advised to use his articles of 1965 and 2005 as useful 
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As Putnam has realized early on, the measurement problem in quantum mechanics arises 
particularly sharply for advocates of scientific realism, i.e., for those who believe that the 
stunning predictive success of quantum mechanics can only be explained if quantum 
mechanics is at least approximately true. This saddles the scientific realist with the task of 
explicating the mathematical formalism of the theory in terms of its reference to the actual 
world. For example, quantum mechanics represents the state of a physical system by so-
called ‘wave functions’. On a realist (or “nonoperationist”) view, for Putnam, offering an 
answer to what the significance of these ‘waves’ is becomes urgent. In other words, the 
scientific realist seeks to provide an interpretation of quantum mechanics. Let me state the 
realist vantage point in Putnam’s own words: 
 
According to [operationalism,] statements about [certain magnitudes, such as distance, 
charge, mass,] are mere shorthand for statements about the results of measuring 
operations... I shall here assume that this philosophy of physics is false... According to 
me, the correct view is that when the physicist talks about electrical charge, he is 
talking quite simply about a certain magnitude that we can distinguish from others 
partly by its ‘formal’ properties..., partly by the structure of the system of laws this 
magnitude obeys..., and partly by its effects. We know that [a charge meter] measures 
electrical charge, not because we have adopted a ‘convention’, or a ‘definition of 
electrical charge in terms of meter readings’, but because we have accepted a body of 
theory that includes a description of the meter itself in the language of the scientific 
theory. And it follows from the theory [...] that the meter measures electrical charge...'' 
(1965, 130f; emphases in original) 
 
If we accept this realist vantage point as the correct way of thinking about not just 
Newtonian physics, but also about quantum mechanics, then, Putnam infers, “the term 
‘measurement’ plays no fundamental role in physical theory as such”, i.e., “ ‘measurement’ 
can never be an undefined term in a satisfactory physical theory…” (132; emphases in 
original) The implied rejection of the fundamentality of measurement, and hence of 
observers, plays a central role in Putnam’s critical evaluation of the various proposed 
interpretations or proto-interpretations, as we will see shortly.  
 
The question before us, then, is whether we can understand or interpret quantum mechanics 
in a way compatible with scientific realism, and if so, how? For the purposes of answering 
this question, Putnam analyzes the most visible interpretations at the time of writing in the 
two essays I shall be centrally concerned with here, viz. those two essays of forty years apart 
treating his eponymous looking at quantum mechanics. These interpretations include, for the 
1965 essay, (a) de Broglie’s pilot wave interpretation, (b) the “original” Born interpretation, 
(c) hidden-variables interpretations, and (d) the Copenhagen interpretation; for the 2005 
sequel, Putnam considers (d), and da capo, (the von Neumann version of) the Copenhagen 
                                                                                                                            
starting points. The Synthese article of 1974 gives classical expression to 
Putnam’s temporary advocacy of quantum logic, and two articles in the 
collection edited by De Caro and Macarthur (2012a, 2012b) serve well as 
recent points of contact.  
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interpretation, (e) GRW, (f) the many-worlds interpretation, and finally (g) Bohmian 
mechanics.  
 
In the next section, Section 2, I shall consider a challenge to Putnam’s claim that quantum 
mechanics stands in need of interpretation aired by Nancy Cartwright (2005) and argue that 
her objections do not succeed. Section 3 analyzes Putnam’s own assessment of the various 
interpretative options that he discusses in 1965 and in 2005. Section 4 concludes with a brief 
summary of my main claims and emphasizes the historical importance of Putnam’s work on 
the foundations of quantum mechanics.  
 
 
2 Cartwright’s challenge 
 
Before we delve into the minutiae of Putnam’s analysis of the various interpretations of 
quantum mechanics, we are well advised to pause over a dissent penned by Nancy 
Cartwright (2005). Her remonstrance is two-pronged. First, she argues that Putnam’s claim 
of 1965 that quantum mechanics needs an interpretation is inconsistent, or at least stands in 
tension, with his 1962 work on the meaning of theoretical terms. Secondly, she insists, pace 
Putnam, that quantum mechanics does not need an interpretation. Let us consider these two 
objections in turn. 
 
 
2.1 The tension with Putnam’s 1962 work on theoretical terms 
 
After reminding the reader of the seminal influence Putnam’s 1965 piece exerted on the 
philosophy of quantum mechanics, Cartwright rushes to agree with its central conclusion, 
viz. that none of the extant interpretations of quantum mechanics can be deemed satisfactory. 
This situation, Cartwright proceeds, has not improved in the forty years hence, for 
contemporary attempts suffer from the very same kinds of difficulties that Putnam listed. 
Less than a page into the essay, however, the gloves come down. Despite the negative 
conclusion, Cartwright contends, we need not despair as the absence of an agreeable 
interpretation can easily be explained: there is no such interpretation because none is needed. 
In fact, she continues, this is the stance that Putnam would have been well advised to take in 
1965, as it was he himself who argued—three years earlier and in a different context—that 
“successful theories do not need interpretation.” (Cartwright 2005, 188; emphasis in 
original) More specifically, Putnam’s claim that quantum mechanics needs an interpretation, 
and in particular that the quantum state, or the wave function, does, stands in conflict with 
what Cartwright takes to be the central conclusion of his famous paper ‘What theories are 
not’ of 1962, viz. “that theoretical terms do not need interpretation.” (ibid., 192). This is 
because 
 
The theory itself, the entire theory with all its diverse uses and implications, gives 
meaning to the quantum state. A concept from a theory like this comes already 
interpreted. This doctrine about meaning begins in ‘What Theories Are Not’, where 
Putnam attacks the idea that scientific concepts should ever be in need of 
interpretation. (ibid.) 
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In ‘What theories are not’, Putnam assails what he takes to be the received view of theories 
in empirical science, viz. Rudolf Carnap’s conception of a scientific theory as partially 
interpreted calculus, i.e.,  
 
as an axiomatic system which may be thought of as initially uninterpreted, and which 
gains ‘empirical meaning’ as a result of a specification of meaning for the observation 
terms alone. A kind of partial meaning is then thought of as drawn up to the 
theoretical terms, by osmosis, at it were. (Putnam 1962, 216; emphasis in original) 
 
This conception of theories of course depends on an alleged dichotomy between 
‘observation’ on the one hand, and ‘theory’ on the other. This dichotomy manifests itself in 
two forms. First, the non-logical vocabulary of the empirical science at stake is partitioned 
into ‘observational’ terms, such as ‘green’, ‘hot’, ‘click’, and ‘theoretical’ terms, such as 
‘boson’, ‘gene’, or ‘supply’. Secondly, the statements of an empirical science are then 
divided into ‘observational’ statements and ‘theoretical’ statements. The latter class 
comprises all and only statements which contain theoretical terms, while the former consists 
of statements which contain only observational terms (and logical vocabulary) and are thus 
free of theoretical terms.  
 
Putnam then spends the remainder of the essay to argue that both forms of the dichotomy 
collapse under the weight of counterexamples and are thus not ultimately tenable. However, 
this seemingly catastrophic failure, he appeases the reader, engenders no alarming 
consequences for our philosophical project of understanding empirical science. Putnam 
contends that the main motivation for positing the dichotomy is flawed: the dichotomy was 
introduced to show how the justification of a theory results from the justification we may 
have for its ‘observational basis’, such that the theoretical terms acquire their meaning 
ultimately in purely observational terms. But the idea that justification necessarily originates 
in pure observation and then percolates from there to the (ever more) theoretical parts of 
science, Putnam expounds, cannot be maintained; rather, “justification in science proceeds 
in any direction that may be handy” (216). 2  Furthermore, both theory-observation 
distinctions introduced above are, Putnam complains, “completely broken-backed” (ibid.).  
 
In order to substantiate this last claim, Putnam offers four sub-theses, each supported by 
examples. First, (excluding constructions such as conjoining every observational term with 
‘and is an observable thing’ whose sole purpose is that of trivially applying only to 
observable things,) ‘observation terms’ are applicable to unobservable objects, a possibility 
                                                
2 In fact, Putnam also states the further contention that the alleged “problem for 
which this dichotomy was invented… does not exist.” (ibid.) The problem, 
supposedly, was to account for the possibility to interpret theoretical terms at 
all. It is not clear to me, however, how there could be such a problem in the 
first place without there being some prior distinction between theoretical and 
non-theoretical terms. As suggested by the remarks following the cited passage, 
Putnam accepts that there is indeed such a pre-existing distinction, however 
imprecise, that the then sharpened dichotomy tries, but fails, to precisify.  
 5 
at least neglected by Carnap. In fact, there is not a single term, it seems, that could not 
possibly be applied to unobservable entities. If ‘observational term’ was thus construed as to 
only apply to observables, then there are no ‘observational’ terms! Once it is granted, 
however, that ‘observational’ terms may apply to unobservables, Putnam contends, then the 
mystery of how terms referring to unobservables get introduced into a language evaporates. 
Furthermore, there is no longer any reason to assume that theories (and hence statements) 
about unobservables must contain ‘theoretical’ terms. 
 
The second sub-thesis asserts that “[m]any terms that refer primarily to what Carnap would 
class as ‘unobservables’ are not theoretical terms; and at least some theoretical terms refer 
primarily to observables.” (217) Concerning the latter part, just consider how theory-laden 
terms like ‘satellite’ may be while still referring to observables; regarding the former, if we 
were to demand that all terms referring to unobservables are ‘theoretical’, then arguably that 
would include many terms of ordinary language (‘angry’ and ‘loves’ are Putnam’s 
examples). 
 
The demarcation between theoretical and observational statements is also problematic, as the 
third and fourth of the sub-theses illustrate. If we insist, with Carnap, that observational 
statements cannot contain theoretical terms, then many observational reports would be 
classified as ‘theoretical’ statements—just consider the report, reaching us from CERN, that 
‘We have observed the Higgs boson.’ Fourth and last, there exist, Putnam claims, scientific 
theories which only refer to observables. Putnam’s example here is Darwin’s theory of 
evolution in its original form. This seems flatly false: terms like ‘inheritance’, ‘species’, 
‘selection’, ‘climate’, and ‘adaptive’ seem hardly more observable than ‘angry’ and ‘loves’. 
In fact, I cannot think of a scientific theory that refers only to observables. Be that as it may, 
Putnam takes both of these claims as evidence that no distinction between observational 
reports and theoretical statements can be based on the vocabulary of the relevant language 
alone. Neither should it, he adds.  
 
Given that no principled distinction can be drawn between either theoretical and 
observational terms or between observational and theoretical statements, it is hardly 
surprising that Putnam denies that the theoretical terms (or the ‘theoretical’ ones), unlike 
observational terms, are only partially interpreted. He then considers, and rejects as either 
inadequate for Carnap’s purposes or as incompatible with a weak form of scientific realism, 
three different ways of conceiving of ‘partial interpretation’ in the light of the failed 
precisified double dichotomy.  
 
This leaves open the problem of how theoretical terms in science do, in fact, acquire 
meaning. But why, asks Putnam, think in the first place that an explication of the meaning of 
theoretical terms in purely observational ones is possible? Once we abandon Carnap’s 
foundationalist empiricism for a minimally realist and more holist view of science, the 
problem loses much of its urgency. By thus exposing the foundationalist prejudices inherent 
in this formulation of the Carnapian problem, Putnam is then free to argue that theoretical 
terms are introduced and learned in roughly the same way as most other words.  
 
Cartwright takes herself to be applying this very lesson to quantum mechanics when she 
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states that its theoretical terms, such as ‘wave function’, do not 
 
need some special kind of interpretation… My claim here is that there is nothing 
peculiar about the quantum-state function. It is just like any other theoretical term, and 
Putnam’s own conclusions apply to it. It does not need an interpretation, much less an 
interpretation in observational/classical terms; nor is such an interpretation likely to be 
possible. (2005, 197) 
 
Instead, Cartwright continues, quantum mechanics receives all the ‘interpretation’ it needs 
through the myriad ways in which it is used and applied; it gets the “attachment [to the 
world] through experiment, technology, explanation and prediction.” (ibid., 189) In other 
words, Cartwright seems to read Putnam to entail that if a ‘partial interpretation’ of the wave 
function in purely observational terms is not feasible (or even desirable) because, to put it 
positively, of the way in which theories get ‘interpreted’ through their use and application, 
then quantum mechanics does not stand in need of an interpretation, i.e., its formal apparatus 
needs no explicit tethering to the world.  
 
The problem with this thesis—Cartwright’s first—is that the measurement problem in 
quantum mechanics, to be introduced momentarily, does not at all rely on the empiricist 
foundationalism that Putnam attacks in ‘What theories are not’, and neither does it depend 
on the theory-observation dichotomy. But the measurement problem establishes, 
conclusively in my view, that quantum mechanics does need an interpretation. The 
measurement problem, and hence the need for interpretation, is not touched by Putnam’s 
arguments of 1962. Consequently, there is no conflict between the 1962 claims and those of 
1965—at least not if the measurement problem is understood as I will present it in §2.3 
below. Arguably, this is not how Cartwright conceives of it; but if it captures (the correct 
precisification of) how Putnam conceives of it, then Cartwright’s charge of inconsistency 
does not stick.  
 
Not only are thus the concerns of 1962 and those of 1965 somewhat orthogonal to one 
another, but Putnam in fact explicitly leaves open the possibility that there may well be some 
theoretical terms in need of interpretation when he writes, admittedly parenthetically, but in 
the very same 1962 essay, that “giving the meaning of theoretical terms in science… may, of 
course, be a problem in specific cases.” (225) I do not know whether Putnam wrote this 
remark with quantum mechanics in mind; but I wouldn’t be surprised if he did.  His earliest 
publication on quantum mechanics that I am aware of is a short commentary on the EPR 
paradox that was published in Philosophy of Science in 1961 (see bibliography). 
Furthermore, in 2005, he tells the reader that he has extensive conversations about the 
measurement problem with a world-famous physicist in 1962. Both of these facts bear 
witness that he must have been thinking about the foundations of quantum mechanics 
around the time he composed ‘What theories are not’. If there were indeed an inconsistency, 
Putnam would have had to be a masterful compartmentalizer! 
 
 
2.2 Cartwright on the measurement problem 
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As claimed above, Cartwright’s contention is bipartite: not only does she think that 
Putnam’s 1965 claims regarding quantum mechanics stand in awkward tension with his own 
1962 rebuttal of Carnap’s insistence on the ‘partial interpretation’ of theoretical terms, but 
she also maintains that he was mistaken to spurn, allegedly, his earlier work and avow that 
quantum mechanics has a serious interpretational issue. In other words, she maintains that 
no interpretation of quantum mechanics is needed, for exactly the reasons given in Putnam 
1962. Central terms like ‘wave function’ acquire their meaning, and all there is to their 
meaning, by the way the quantum state behaves in all the many experimental settings in 
which quantum mechanics is tested, all the many technological applications in which it is 
used, and, of course, through the operative “constraints of theoretical practice”3, i.e., through 
the full network of pertinent inferences—including theoretical ones—in which quantum 
mechanics is engaged. It is evident, she argues, that if we look at all these cases of 
experimentation and application, that “there is no single formula that covers all the various 
connections we find.” (198) There is no “one magic formula” (ibid.) that would fit the bill, 
she continues, let alone one in purely observational terms.4 
 
In §5, Cartwright discusses, and dismisses, the most famous of all arguments to the 
conclusion that there is a measurement problem in quantum mechanics: the thought 
experiment involving Schrödinger’s cat. She discounts Schrödinger’s cat as a “fantasy” 
(199) trading in unreal, and unrealistic, physical set-ups and processes. She complains that 
“of course there are no such quantum states as ‘cat alive’ and ‘cat dead’”, and that “[t]here is 
no such thing as the ‘cat-alive/cat-dead’ operator.” (ibid.)  
 
But this is altogether too quick: although it’s true that Schrödinger’s cat is a “story invented 
to match an abstract piece of formalism and an abstract concept of measurement” (ibid.), it 
points precisely to a seemingly insuperable obstacle in attaching quantum mechanics to the 
real world—regardless of how successfully the theory is used and applied! In other words, 
there really is a ‘measurement problem’, independently of how realistic Schrödinger’s set-up 
with the cat and the various contraptions it involves is.  
 
Before I move to restate the argument establishing that there is a measurement problem, it 
should be noted that Cartwright’s own views on the measurement problem have evolved 
considerably since the beginning of her career. In her 1975, she was moved to accept that 
there is a measurement problem, and found realist interpretations denying the eigenstate-
                                                
3 Cartwright, private communication on 11 June 2014. 
4 One might worry that this mischaracterizes the problem, which is not to give 
the meaning of the term ‘wavefunction’, and perhaps of other theoretical terms, 
in classical or purely observational terms, but instead to parse out what the 
theory asserts regarding the aspects of the world it seeks to describe. But what 
Cartwright perhaps has in mind here is the distinction between the microscopic 
and the macroscopic world on which traditional attempts to solve the 
measurement problem rely. Most contemporary approaches to solve the 
measurement problem, however, are ‘observer-independent’, i.e., they assume 
no such fundamental dichotomy between quantum systems and classical 
observers. 
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eigenvalue link such as that proposed by Danieri, Loinger, and Prosperi the most congenial 
and promising—against what she cites in 1983 as objections made in Putnam 1965!5 
Putnam’s objection, accepted by Cartwright in 1983 (cf. p. 170), was that the proposal fails 
to solve the measurement problem because the post-measurement state is still a 
superposition rather than an eigenstate. By 1983, thus, she rejects her earlier, overly realist, 
solution, in favour of a collapse interpretation asserting the ‘reduction of the wave packet’, 
trading on indeterministic “transition probabilities”.6 She denies, however, that there is a 
measurement problem; or, rather, she insists that there is no measurement problem, but 
instead the remaining issue of adjudicating when a system’s dynamics is governed by the 
Schrödinger evolution and when a reduction of the wave packet occurs (see below). She 
insists, however, that his “characterization” problem is merely an artifact of the 
mathematical representation of the system’s dynamics in terms of two mutually exclusive 
categories of evolutions when in fact the real physical system just evolves according to the 
more general ‘quantum statistical law’ encompassing both. As this more general dynamical 
law encompasses both unitary Schrödinger evolution as well as non-unitary dynamics, if one 
cuts through her rhetoric, then rather than denying the measurement problem, she can be 
read as advocating a solution to it based on a rejection of what will be claim (B) in the next 
section (§2.3). But I shall desist from any sustained assessment of her 1983 proposal and 
only add that I concur with Butterfield’s (1983) conclusion that Cartwright offers more of a 
research agenda than a full-fledged theory.  
 
By 1999, Cartwright moved away from her collapse approach awarding centre stage to 
transition probabilities in order to endorse what she dubs a “have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too” 
strategy to address the “problem of superposition” (1999, 212). Even though there were 
inklings of an anti-fundamentalist stance earlier, she now (in 1999) identifies as the enemy 
not the realist, but instead the fundamentalist, who takes quantum mechanics (or anyway 
some quantum theory or other) to be a fundamental und universally applicable theory. 
Against quantum fundamentalism, Cartwright contends that “quantum theory is severely 
limited in its scope of application.” (ibid., 214) In a dappled world, macroscopic measuring 
devices must be described by a different theory from the electrons with which they interact. 
In the classical theory of the macroscopic objects, no superposition states are allowed. 
Classical and quantum mechanics are both necessary, and neither is sufficient by itself. 
Consequently, there simply is no mystery as to why measurement outcomes are determinate. 
This raises the obvious question of what governs interactions between the two realms. For 
Cartwright, the answer must be found in the many connections forged in actual scientific, 
and particularly experimental, practice, and not in some unique magic formula relating the 
two. Cartwright acknowledges that there is no guarantee that this ‘retail’ solution will never 
run into an inconsistency between the two descriptions; this possibility, however, is a far cry 
from the universal angst spread by the scaremongers of ‘wholesale’ quantum imperialism. 
She insists that “[s]o far we have failed to find a single contradiction” (233) between 
classical and quantum physics, and challenges the reader to identify an inconsistency. 
Unfortunately, Cartwright’s confidence is misplaced, as such an inconsistency can not only 
be identified, but is found to be both rampant and pervasive. This is the topic of the next 
                                                
5 Putnam (1965) does not explicitly mention the proposal due to Danieri et al. 
6 Cf. 1983, Ch. 9. 
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subsection.  
 
 
2.3 Does quantum mechanics need an interpretation? 
 
Let me briefly summarize the main tenets of the theory to see how the measurement problem 
arises.7 In fact, we only need three basic principles of quantum mechanics to derive the 
problem. The first asserts the completeness of the quantum-mechanical description of the 
state of a system: 
 
Principle 1 [Completeness] 
The wave function contains the complete information about the physical state of the 
system at stake.  
 
In fact, the state of a quantum-mechanical system is more generally described by a unit 
vector in a so-called Hilbert space, i.e., a vector space with an inner product.8 The reason 
why vector spaces turn out to be so perfectly adequate for the task of representing the state 
spaces of quantum-mechanical systems is because they naturally encode another principle of 
quantum mechanics, the infamous superposition principle: 
 
Principle 2 [Superposition] 
If |𝐴  is a possible physical state (or the wave function describing it) of some system, 
and if |𝐵  is a (distinct) possible physical state of the same system, then α|𝐴  + β|𝐵  is 
also a possible state, where α, β ∈ ℂ.  
 
Here, as below, I use Dirac’s ‘bra-ket notation’ of denoting vectors in a Hilbert space by 
‘|𝐴 ’, ‘|𝐵 ’, etc. Principle 2 is notable because it is clearly not valid in classical physics: if a 
system can be located here, and if it can also be located there, it does not follow that it can 
simultaneously be located ‘here and there’, whatever exactly that may mean. Linear 
combinations of admissible states with classically admissible properties will not in general 
also be admissible states with classically admissible properties. Principle 2 asserts that this is 
always possible in quantum mechanics, for any pair of admissible states.  
 
Since the measurement problem arises dynamically, we also need a principle concerning the 
dynamical evolution of quantum-mechanical states. Here it is: 
 
Principle 3 [Schrödinger evolution] 
                                                
7 For a very accessible introduction to quantum mechanics, its measurement 
problem, and many of the various proposed solutions, cf. Albert 1992. A 
particularly sharp formulation of the measurement problem has been given in 
Maudlin 1995. The presentation of the problem here owes much to both of 
these sources. 
8 More precisely, unit vectors (or rays) in a Hilbert space represent pure states. 
Thus, a further generalization would include mixed states as well. However, 
this generalization is unnecessary for the point to be made here. 
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Given the state of any physical system at any ‘initial’ time, and given the forces and 
constraints to which the system is subject, the Schrödinger equation gives a 
prescription whereby the state of that system at any other time is uniquely determined.  
 
This dynamics of the state vector is thus deterministic. You may be aware of the standard 
lore according to which quantum mechanics is indeterministic. Whether this is indeed so is 
actually a contentious matter, and depends on one’s solution of the measurement problem, as 
we will see below, and consequently, on the interpretation of quantum mechanics one 
endorses (Wüthrich 2011). What is uncontroversial however, is that if Principle 3 states 
everything there is to be stated about the dynamical evolution of a quantum-mechanical state, 
as we assume for the moment, then that evolution is deterministic.  
 
There is no need for us to consider the full mathematical glory of the Schrödinger equation; 
in fact, the only property of the equation relevant for the purposes of incurring a 
‘measurement’ problem is that it is linear. A dynamical law is linear just in case if any state |𝐴  at time 𝑡! is evolved into another state |𝐴′  at a later time 𝑡! and any other state |𝐵  at 𝑡! 
is evolved into |𝐵′  at 𝑡!, then 𝛼|𝐴 +   𝛽|𝐵  at 𝑡! is evolved into 𝛼|𝐴′ +   𝛽|𝐵′  at 𝑡!. In 
other words, a superposition evolves just as a superposition of the evolutes of its component 
states. What this means, of course, is that whenever a system starts out in a superposition 
state, it will always remain in a superposition state for as long as Principle 3 alone governs 
its dynamical evolution. 
 
Suppose now that we have a quantum system with a spin degree of freedom, such as an 
electron, and a measuring device equipped to measure the spin in a particular direction 
orthogonal to the direction of flight of incoming particles. In order to keep things simple, let 
us just assume that it has a dial with three settings, ‘ready’, ‘𝑧-up’, and ‘𝑧-down’, indicating 
that the device is ready to make a measurement, has found the particle to have up spin in the 𝑧-direction, and down spin in the same direction, respectively. We start the experiment by 
preparing the device to be in the ready state (such that it reads ‘ready’), and then feed 
electrons into it in order to get their 𝑧-spin measured. The measurements are then recorded 
by the final position of the dial (‘𝑧-up’ or ‘𝑧-down’, as the case may be).  
 
It is important to assume that the measurement apparatus measures ‘faithfully’, i.e., that it 
‘correctly’ records the spin of the measured electrons. More precisely, we demand that 
 |ready !|𝑧-­‐up ! →    |'𝑧-­‐up' !|𝑧-­‐up ! (1) |ready !|𝑧-­‐down !   →    |'𝑧-­‐down' !|𝑧-­‐down ! (2) 
 
where the subscripts 𝑚 and 𝑒 designate the states of the measuring device and the electron, 
respectively. Note the quotes in the post-measurement state of the device; they should 
indicate that the device is not itself in a 𝑧-up or 𝑧-down state, but rather in the state of 
having recorded a 𝑧-up or 𝑧-down state.  
 
From Principle 2, (1) and (2), and from the linearity of the dynamical law of Principle 3, it 
follows that there exists an ‘𝑥-up’ state for the electron,  
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|𝑥-­‐up =    !! |𝑧-­‐up +    !! |𝑧-­‐down , 
 
which, if fed into a ready measuring device, evolves, with certainty, into the total state 
 !! |'𝑧-­‐up' !|𝑧-­‐up ! + !! |'𝑧-­‐down' !|𝑧-­‐down !. (3) 
 
The problem with (3) is that the dial of the device is in a superposition of showing that the 
electron had spin up and that it had spin down. But however probabilistic the dynamics may 
be, measurements seem to have determinate outcomes, so that in the present case we ought 
to get for the total state of the device-cum-electron either |'𝑧-­‐up' !|𝑧-­‐up ! , with 50% 
probability, or |'𝑧-­‐down' !|𝑧-­‐down ! , with 50% probability, rather than some 
superposition state. Although it violates Principle (3), this leads to states that permit definite 
measurement outcomes. But it is measurably9 different from (3)! On the other hand, (3) is a 
state in which there is simply no fact of the matter about where the pointer is pointing.  
 
This leads to the following sharp formulation of the measurement problem, which I borrow 
from Maudlin 1995, and which has now become standard: 
 
The following three claims are mutually inconsistent. 
 
[(A)] The wave-function of a system is complete, i.e. the wave-function specifies 
(directly or indirectly) all of the physical properties of a system. 
 
[(B)] The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation 
(e.g. the Schrödinger equation). 
 
[(C)] Measurements of, e.g., the spin of an electron always (or at least usually) have 
determinate outcomes, i.e., at the end of the measurement the measuring device is 
either in a state which indicates spin up (and not down) or spin down (and not up). 
(1995, 7) 
 
Since the three propositions (A), (B), and (C) are mutually inconsistent, at least one of them 
has to be given up. But simply pointing out one of them as to be denied does not by itself 
constitute a solution to the measurement problem: since denying any of them either strikes 
down, or at least seriously curtails, a major principle of quantum mechanics (in the case of 
(A) and (B)) or else invalidates what appears to be a perfectly uncontroversial assertion 
concerning our experimental practice (in the case of (C)), one must complement the 
rejection of a chosen proposition with a theory which delivers a complete way of thinking 
about the quantum-mechanical system and how it relates to our observable world.  
 
Solutions to the measurement problem can naturally be classified, then, in accordance to 
which of the propositions above they deny. Hidden-variables theories reject that the 
wavefunction captures all the physical degrees of freedom of a quantum system and thus 
                                                
9 Albert 1992, p. 76n. Cf. also ibid., Ch. 5 (particularly the digression). 
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deny (A). Theories in this camp have to list what these additional degrees of freedom are, 
and specify the dynamical equations which govern their evolution, including how they 
couple to the wavefunction. The most prominent theory denying (A) is, of course, Bohmian 
mechanics.  
 
So-called ‘collapse theories’, such as GRW, amend the linear evolution asserted in (B) with 
episodes of non-linear evolution that explicitly violate the Schrödinger equation, or replace 
the latter altogether with a more general—and non-linear—dynamical law. The central task 
of approaches in this family is to give the full non-linear dynamics, and to lay down exactly 
under which conditions it applies.  
 
The final group of solutions repudiates (C); these so-called ‘many-worlds’ theories aver that 
we only seemingly obtain determinate measurement outcomes when in reality, the state of 
the total system of both electron and measuring device is still as in (3). Approaches 
disavowing (C) must then give an account consistent with the quantum-mechanical statistics 
we experimentally find of why measurement outcomes appear determinate when in fact they 
are not. 
 
Whatever the merits and demerits of the different approaches to solving the measurement 
problem may be (we will get to that shortly), let me close the section by emphasizing the 
two conclusions we have reached so far. First, demanding an interpretation of quantum 
mechanics is perfectly consistent with rejecting empiricist foundationalism and its attendant 
theory-observation dichotomy. Second, the measurement problem offers an inconsistency 
that must be addressed; any solution to it will, ipso facto, offer an interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.  
 
 
3 Putnam’s assessment of the interpretative options 
 
The central purpose of Putnam’s two articles of 1965 and 2005 is the same: to evaluate some 
of the promising, or anyway most famous, interpretations of quantum mechanics that have 
been suggested. In 1965, these include most prominently de Broglie’s pilot wave 
interpretation, Born’s “original” ignorance interpretation, hidden-variables theories, and the 
Copenhagen interpretation. Forty years later, the focus is on collapse theories (some of 
which did not yet exist in 1965), many-worlds interpretations, and hidden-variables theories 
again. The goal of the present section is to go through at least some of Putnam’s evaluations 
of the various approaches, so that the reader gets a sense of how incisive and (mostly) apt 
Putnam’s criticisms of the discussed programs are. Given the scope of this article, I cannot 
possibly do full justice to either these programs or to Putnam’s criticisms of them. The 
necessary brevity of my remarks may thus occasionally puzzle those with no prior 
familiarity with interpretations of quantum mechanics. Where appropriate, I will try to make 
amends by giving references to work that can fill the gaps I leave open.  
 
 
3.1 Taking a first look: 1965 
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Putnam’s 1965 essay “A philosopher looks at quantum mechanics” starts out from an 
assertion of scientific realism, as explicated in Section 1. Putnam takes the rejection of the 
fundamentality of measurement to be a straight consequence of his realism. This means that 
‘measurement’ cannot function as a primitive term in any theory claiming to solve the 
measurement problem.  
 
Starting out from the fact that the quantum-mechanical state can be represented by a 
wavefunction, Putnam then addresses the question of the significance of these ‘waves’—a 
central issue for any solution of the measurement problem.10 The first answer Putnam 
considers was also the first historically: de Broglie’s ‘pilot wave interpretation’. De Broglie 
formulated the pilot wave approach in 1927, one year after Schrödinger published his wave 
approach to quantum mechanics. The approach was quickly abandoned, but is historically 
significant as a stepping stone toward Bohmian mechanics.11  
 
De Broglie’s main idea was simply to reify the ‘waves’ used to represent quantum-
mechanical states: rather than mere representations, the waves are physical entities, so that 
the state of the system simply is the system of waves. Putnam unceremoniously—and 
rightly—discards this approach as unsuccessful. The first problem to note is that quantum 
‘waves’ are rather unlike the waves we know and love. For starters, unlike real waves, they 
have complex amplitudes. Moreover, they live in Hilbert space, which is not physical space, 
but the mathematically abstract ‘state space’ of quantum mechanics. Finally, the ‘reduction 
of the wave packet’ or collapse seemingly necessary to reproduce the experimental 
outcomes actually found subjects the physical wave to a nonlinear (Putnam says 
“discontinuous”, but this need not be so) change upon measurement from being very spread 
out to a highly localized wave packet. At the very least, such momentary contractions seem 
incompatible with the usual behaviour of physical waves, thus considerably lessening the 
appeal of an interpretation of the wave function in terms of physical waves. 
 
The second interpretation analyzed by Putnam is Born’s “original” interpretation, according 
to which the elementary particles described by quantum mechanics are classical, insofar as 
they are pointlike masses with determinate position and velocity. However, these particles 
don’t obey the classical laws of Newtonian mechanics. Instead, they are ultimately governed 
by quantum-mechanical laws. On Born’s interpretation, the wave function does not 
represent the state of the system, but rather of our incomplete knowledge of it, such that the 
square of the intensity of the wave inside a given region gives the probability that the 
particle is actually there.12 This way of conceiving of the wave function’s meaning avoids 
the difficulties that de Broglie’s pilot wave interpretation faced, in particular vis-à-vis 
collapse, when it insisted on the physicality of the ‘wave’: as it merely represents our 
knowledge, we seem free to interpret it as a purely mathematical object tracking what we 
know about the state of the system at stake and the sudden jolts that occur the instant we 
                                                
10 And the topic of a recent collection of essays, cf. Ney and Albert 2013. 
11 For the connection to Bohmian mechanics, see Goldstein 2013. 
12 This is of course ‘Born’s Rule’, which is taken over e.g. by the later 
‘Copenhagen interpretation’, which is indebted to Born’s “original” 
interpretation.  
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learn of a measurement outcome. However, just as we evade the troubles that collapse 
foisted on any attempt to take the wave as a physical object, we lose its ability to offer a 
physical mechanism that accounts for the physical interference patterns that we observe on 
the detection screen in two-slit experiments. How can such interference occur if there are no 
waves that produce it? 
 
More decisively, Putnam shows how Born’s interpretation cannot adequately deal with 
superpositions. Suppose we have a large ensemble of quantum systems such that each of 
them can have any of two incompatible properties 𝒜 and ℬ. These properties are associated 
with operators 𝐴  and 𝐵  on the single-system Hilbert space, and these operators have 
eigenvectors in that Hilbert space such that 𝐴 𝑎 =   𝛼 𝑎  and 𝐵|𝑏 = 𝛽|𝑏 . Assuming that 
we have available a perfectly faithful measurement apparatus, we will thus obtain the 
following measurement outcomes: if all the systems in the ensemble are in state |𝑎  (or |𝑏 , 
respectively), then 100% of the measurements on single quantum systems will yield 
outcome 𝛼 (or 𝛽, respectively). According to Principle 2 above, the state 𝑐 = 𝜆! 𝑎 +𝜆!|𝑏  is also a possible state of an individual quantum system in the ensemble. Measuring a 
number of systems prepared to be in the identical state |𝑐  we might obtain that 
 
(a) measurements of observable 𝒜 yield outcome 𝛼 in 60% of the cases, 
 
but we might also get that 
 
(b) measurements of observable ℬ yield outcome 𝛽 in 60% of the cases. 
 
Since the properties 𝒜 and ℬ are incompatible, i.e. 𝐴,𝐵 ≠ 0, there are no simultaneous 
eigenstates for 𝐴  and 𝐵 , and we cannot perform simultaneous measurements of both 
properties. In other words, if we first measure one of them on some systems, and then 
measure the other on the same systems, then we will obtain different statistics than if we 
performed only the second type of measurements. Thus, we cannot make measurements to 
check (a) and (b) on the same systems. However, if the wave function or the quantum state 
merely represented our incomplete knowledge of the systems’ states—rather than some 
physical feature of these systems—, it would be utterly mysterious how our knowledge 
could be affected by the order of measurements on otherwise identical systems. The only 
explanation seems to be that the measurements we perform make a physical difference; they 
change the systems’ states rather than just our knowledge of them.  
 
Putnam identifies the following principle to which Born’s interpretation is committed as the 
culprit: 
 
Principle [No Disturbance (ND)] 
“The measurement does not disturb the observable measured—i.e. the observable has 
almost the same value an instant before the measurement as it does at the moment the 
measurement is taken.” (138) 
 
Before any measurement is made on the systems prepared to be in state |𝑐 , (a) and (b) 
cannot both be true—but they would have to be if ND were true. Thus, experimental facts 
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concerning quantum systems such as those described above seem plainly incompatible with 
ND.13 Given the overwhelming evidence conflicting with it, ND ought to be rejected, and 
with it Born’s original interpretation.  
 
Next, Putnam turns to so-called ‘hidden-variables interpretations’, i.e. interpretations that 
deny proposition (A) in Maudlin’s articulation of the measurement problem. The front 
runner in this camp is (and was in 1965) Bohm’s mechanics, originally proposed in Bohm 
1952.14 Bohmian mechanics takes the fundamental ontology to consist of particles, which all 
have determinate positions. ND is valid only for position measurements. Other properties 
these particles may have, such as spin, are only contextually exemplified and thus not 
fundamental, and hence ND is false of them. Putnam’s main criticism of hidden-variables 
theories is that the (general) falsity of ND forces them to adopt very strange laws. For 
instance, Putnam complains, Bohm’s theory requires a strangely behaving ‘quantum 
potential’, i.e. an unknown force for which there is no (direct) evidence, in order to account 
for the violation of ND brought about by the disturbance of the state by the measurement. 
This criticism is somewhat misguided—at least by present lights, as most Bohmians no 
longer defend the original ‘quantum potential’ version of their theory and instead regard it as 
a “first-order theory, in which it is the velocity, the rate of change of position, that is 
fundamental.” (Goldstein 2013, Sec. 5)  
 
Putnam proposes that we accept the general invalidity of the principle ND, including for 
position measurements, as a “condition of adequacy” (145) any candidate interpretation of 
quantum mechanics must satisfy.15 This would of course rule out Bohmian mechanics. But 
                                                
13 See Albert 1992, Chapter 1, for a very accessible account of why 
measurements on quantum systems which are not in an eigenstate of the 
measured observable necessarily amount to a ‘disturbance’, at least if the 
quantum state is taken to be complete and measurement outcomes determinate.  
14 For the most up-to-date and authoritative account of Bohmian mechanics, 
see Goldstein 2013. Cf. also Albert 1992, Chapter 7. 
15 Putnam’s three conditions of adequacy are as follows: 
“A. The principle ND should not be assumed even for position measurement. 
“B. The symmetry of quantum mechanics, represented by the fact that one 
‘representation’ has no more and no less physical significance than any other, 
should not be broken. In particular, we should not treat the waves employed in 
one representation (position representation in the case of the hidden variable 
theorists) as descriptions of physically real waves in ordinary space. 
“C. The phenomena of superposition of states... must be explained 
in a unitary way.” (145f) 
Putnam claims that hidden-variables interpretations stand in violation of all 
these conditions. Bohmians would naturally repudiate conditions A and B—
their violation, they will rightly insist, is a feature, not a bug of their 
interpretation. Bohmian mechanics does have its issues, but they lie elsewhere. 
I am not sure about the precise meaning and status of condition C. Putnam 
charges Bohmian mechanics with a violation of C based on the now obsolete 
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there is really no reason why we should accept such a sweeping a priori condition of 
adequacy. Thus, his argument against Bohmian mechanics does not ultimately succeed, as 
he acknowledges in 2005. But in 1965, he rejects hidden-variables interpretations as 
solutions to the measurement problem. 
 
The fourth interpretation analyzed by Putnam is the Copenhagen interpretation, formerly 
also the standard interpretation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. At core, the 
Copenhagen interpretation assumes the completeness of the quantum state, takes 
measurement outcomes to be determinate, and fundamentally distinguishes between physical 
systems that are ‘measuring devices’ and those that are not. It will thus have to deny (B) 
above. Roughly, then, interactions between a measuring device and a non-measuring system 
will lead to the ‘collapse’ of the quantum state of the latter, while interactions among non-
measuring systems have no such effect.16 This would solve the measurement problem if we 
are given a principled, and fundamental, distinction between the two kinds of physical 
systems, as well as a precise measurement dynamics, i.e. a dynamical law for those 
occasions, identified in a principled manner by an answer to the first request, when the usual 
Schrödinger evolution is upended. Unfortunately, the Copenhagen interpretation furnishes 
neither.  
 
On the Copenhagen interpretation, particles do not have determinate properties, but only 
propensities to be unveiled by suitable measurements. This leads to a slight modification of 
Born’s rule: the squared amplitude of the wave does not measure the probability that the 
particle is in a certain place, but instead the probability that it would be found in that place if 
a position measurement were made. This interpretation rejects ND by assuming 
‘complementarity’, i.e. the idea that 𝒜-measurements and ℬ-measurements cannot be made 
simultaneously.  
 
Putnam judges that the Copenhagen interpretation straightforwardly satisfies his first two 
conditions of adequacy, but that the third is doubtful, since superpositions are not explained, 
but instead stipulated as primitives of the theory. More importantly, Putnam identifies the 
interpretation’s reliance upon ‘measurement’ as a primitive term as its main deficiency 
because it violates one of the basic assumptions of scientific realism. The problem remains 
standing even 40 years after the inception of the theory, Putnam argues, because various 
attempts to spell out what ‘measurements’ amount to are unsuccessful due to the fact that 
they leave other, related terms unacceptably primitive, such as ‘macro-observable’.  
 
In effect, Putnam thus articulates what is now the standard complaint against the 
Copenhagen interpretation as I lodged it above: this leads directly to the measurement 
problem in the form of Schrödinger’s cat and to the attendant difficulty of making sense of 
the dual requirements of separating the world into the measured and the measuring and of 
the demand of the universal applicability of quantum mechanics. According to the 
Copenhagen interpretation, micro-observables, i.e., those associated with the measured 
                                                                                                                            
reliance on a ‘quantum potential’. Be that as it may, I find nothing intrinsically 
objectionable in the way modern Bohmians explain superpositions.  
16 For details of this view—skipped here—cf. Fay 2008. 
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system, don’t exist unless they are in fact measured, but the macro-observables, i.e., those 
pertaining to the measuring system, take sharp values at all times. This renders 
measurements as an interaction between micro- and macro-observables, and it awards a 
special status to macro-observables insofar as they retain sharp values. This, Putnam 
criticizes, amounts to an underived assumption of the theory standing in tension with 
quantum mechanics’ claim to universality. Putnam summarizes: 
 
The question we face is whether from such a quantum-mechanical characterization of 
a macro-observable together with the laws of quantum mechanics it is possible to 
deduce that macro-observables retain sharp values whether a measurement interaction 
involving them is going on or not. If we can do this, then the appearance of paradox 
and the ad hoc character of the [Copenhagen interpretation] will disappear. In spite of 
a number of very ingenious attempts, it does not appear that this can be done. (150f) 
 
Putnam’s claim in the last sentence of the quote is based on his ensuing discussion of how 
these attempts fail to circumvent the problem with Schrödinger’s cat. The Copenhagen 
interpretation, Putnam infers, is thus at best an incomplete interpretation of quantum 
mechanics. Given his negative 1965 analysis of the four then main competitors to furnish 
such an interpretation, Putnam feels compelled to end on a rather bleak note: “In conclusion, 
then, no satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics exists today.” (157; emphasis in 
original) 
 
 
3.2 Taking another look: 2005 
 
The general conclusion four decades later is only slightly less dreary. But before we get 
there, let me note some salient differences (and similarities) to the analysis Putnam offered 
in 1965. First, John von Neumann’s version of the Copenhagen interpretation is rejected, 
and for similar reasons as was the version due to Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr forty 
years earlier. Second, the main argument of 1965 against hidden-variables theories is 
retracted. Third, new interpretations, largely unknown or altogether unarticulated in 1965, 
are being considered. Fourth, the focus shifts a bit from analyzing various interpretations—
and rejecting them as inadequate—to classifying them. Fifth, a new condition of adequacy is 
introduced: ‘Einstein’s bed’. ‘Einstein’s bed’ plays a central role in Putnam’s rejection of 
von Neumann’s collapse postulate, so let’s turn to that first. 
 
When Putnam joined the Princeton faculty in 1953, his PhD advisor17 Hans Reichenbach 
organized for him to meet with Einstein. So when Einstein and Putnam met and when they 
talked about quantum mechanics, Einstein said something along the following lines: 
 
‘Look, I don’t believe that when I am not in my bedroom my bed spreads out all over 
the room, and whenever I open the door and come in it jumps into the corner.’ (624) 
 
                                                
17 And my own academic great-grandfather. I am honored to note, incidentally, 
that this makes Putnam my academic granduncle! 
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If we assume some mild form of realism and the universal validity of quantum mechanics 
and hence reject the possibility that our bed is in no determinate position but smeared across 
our bedroom when we are out looking at the moon, then we will share Einstein’s disbelief. If 
we reject unobserved deliquescent beds and far-flung moons for these reasons, then we 
cannot grant measurements the exclusive power to ‘collapse’ quantum states and should join 
Einstein in repudiating von Neumann’s collapse postulate which asserts just that. As Putnam 
puts it, the determinateness of measurement outcomes should naturally fall out of the 
theory—not by stipulating some ad hoc principles such as the collapse postulate.  
 
Turning to the classificatory task then, Putnam distinguishes between two principal families 
of interpretations: those that invoke some sort of collapse and those that don’t.18 Both 
families of interpretations fall into two classes of their own, depending on their answer to 
the central question each family faces. For collapse theories, this means that they need to 
take a stance as to whether the collapse is induced by a measurement, i.e., by some physical 
system external to the measured system and not subject to the superposition principle, as von 
Neumann envisages, or whether collapse occurs in some other way. If we accept Einstein’s 
bed as a condition of adequacy for any interpretation, then proposals in the quadrant 
populated by theories which take the collapse they accept to be prompted by measurement 
are out. The collapse theories that remain, then, are those which do not rely on 
measurements and are thus not ‘observer-dependent’. The most important among them are 
‘spontaneous’ collapse theories such as GRW, to which we will turn shortly. 
 
For those interpretations which deprived themselves of the services of a collapse of the 
quantum state, however occasioned, to obtain determinate measurement outcomes, the 
central question before them is whether they permit additional degrees of freedom—hidden 
variables—that would determine the determinate measurement outcomes. Among those 
interpretations which accept hidden variables we find of course Bohmian mechanics. Here, 
the important thing for our present purpose is to note that Putnam (2005, 622f) retracts his 
earlier criticisms of Bohm’s theory and insists that it cannot, at this point, be dismissed from 
consideration. Finally, any approach forfeiting the services of both collapse and hidden 
variables, as should be clear from the characterization of the measurement problem as given 
in Section 2.3 above, is forced to give up the seemingly natural tenet—(C) above—that 
measurement outcomes are in fact determinate. Everettian many-worlds interpretations fall 
into this camp. 
 
Let us turn, with Putnam, to an analysis of GRW.19 GRW and related collapse theories deny 
proposition (B) in §2.3 and solve the measurement problem by offering a new dynamical 
law. Since these theories are observer-independent, they do not dissect physical process into 
two fundamentally distinct kinds (ordinary processes and measurements), thus 
circumventing one difficulty of the Copenhagen interpretation. In GRW (and related 
theories), the collapse is not induced by a measurement but occurs spontaneously according 
to a modified dynamical law which includes stochastic and non-linear terms. According to 
                                                
18 See Table 2 on page 626 of Putnam 2005. 
19 GRW was proposed in Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986. For a systematic 
introduction with an eye to the philosophical foundations, cf. Ghirardi 2011. 
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GRW, each fundamental quantum system in the universe has a tiny, but non-zero probability 
that the system spontaneously localizes in some small region. Einstein’s bed—let alone the 
moon—thus always has a determinate position, even if no one is near the bedroom. The 
reason for this is that even though each of the bed’s particles only has a minuscule 
probability to be spontaneously localized in a location near a corner of Einstein’s bedroom 
over the next few milliseconds, because the bed is made up of a very large number of 
particles, however, the probability that some particle is spontaneously localized during that 
interval is essentially one. And if one of the bed’s particles undergoes a spontaneous 
localization, all the others get whacked into their place, courtesy of the bonds that obtain 
among the particles. So while it is possible that Einstein’s bed smears across the bedroom, 
this is fantastically unlikely; so unlikely in fact that Putnam is safe to say that “it will never 
happen.” (624)  
 
Even though it keeps Einstein’s bed in place, GRW is still faced with significant challenges, 
as recognized by Putnam. One of the major deficiencies of collapse theories, including 
GRW, is that they are not Lorentz invariant and thus seem not to afford a relativistic 
generalization that most believe is necessary. The tension between collapse theories and 
special relativity arises because the state that collapses is a global, i.e., spatially extended, 
state of a system at a given time and that appears to stand in stark contradiction to the 
relativity of simultaneity at the heart of relativity. Just as Bohmian mechanics, GRW is a 
non-relativistic theory. However, as John Bell recognized in 1987, GRW comes equipped 
with a property, ‘multi-time translation invariance’, that renders it as relativistic as a non-
relativistic theory can get. Still, it is not relativistic, and this undercuts GRW’s status as a 
fundamental theory. First steps to remedy that situation are undertaken in Tumulka 2006. 
 
Putting concerns regarding Lorentz invariance to the side, it should be noted that GRW 
navigates a narrow passage between violating energy conservation and (allegedly) failing to 
solve the measurement problem. If the spontaneous localization of elementary particles were 
arbitrarily sharp, then, as Putnam remarks, its complementary magnitude, the particle’s 
momentum, would be arbitrarily indeterminate courtesy to uncertainty, leading to possibly 
arbitrarily high energies, in violation of energy conversation. Of course, this threat is 
minimized in GRW in that the spontaneous localization is not fully sharp. This limits 
possible violations of the conservation of energy to unobservably small scales. However, 
even though the wave function is strongly peaked around one location, the wave function in 
general does not vanish elsewhere and in fact may be non-zero everywhere in space—even 
after a spontaneous localization. On the standard interpretation of the wave function, there is 
then a non-vanishing probability that, to put it coarsely, we find Einstein’s bed in the patent 
office, not in his bedroom! This has become known as the ‘problem of the tails’ of the wave 
function. If this were the case, then even though the probability of Einstein’s bed ending up 
anywhere but his bedroom is vanishingly small, this would hardly constitute a satisfactory 
solution to the measurement problem.  
 
As Giancarlo Ghirardi (2011, §12) notes—quite correctly in my view—the problem of the 
tails only arises if one accepts the standard ‘probabilistic’ interpretation of the wave function, 
i.e. the one effectively captured by Born’s rule. Arguably, it can be circumvented if one 
adopts a ‘primitive ontology’ according to which the wave function describes the mass 
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density or the ‘flash’ density. On such an interpretation, the fact that the wave function does 
not vanish elsewhere does not mean that there is a small chance that Einstein’s bed appears 
in the patent office, but rather that a tiny part of it in fact appears there.20 This solution to the 
tails problem is not uncontroversial, but I refer the reader to Ghirardi 2011 (§12) and 
references therein for details of the controversy.  
 
Despite these troubles, GRW remains on the table for Putnam. This is not the case for 
Everettian many-worlds interpretations.21 Solutions to the measurement problem in this 
family deny (C), i.e., the idea that there are determinate measurement outcomes. 
Determinate outcomes of measurements, on this approach, are illusory; all possible 
measurement outcomes in fact obtain. Maximal sets of consistent measurement outcomes 
constitute the many ‘worlds’ there are according to these interpretations. The specific many-
worlds interpretation that Putnam considers is the somewhat outdated version essentially due 
to Bryce DeWitt (1970) according to which the world physically splits into two each time a 
measurement with two possible outcomes is performed.22 Let us see what Putnam thinks the 
problem with many-worlds interpretations is.  
 
Suppose you are about to make a z-spin measurement on a particle in an x-spin eigenstate. 
As you perform the measurement, the world splits into two: in one world, the z-spin will be 
up, it will be measured to be up, and you will become aware that it is up; in the other, it will 
be down, it will be measured to be down, and you will become aware that it is down. The 
problem is that such an account, it seems, cannot, in general, get the quantum mechanical 
probabilities right. First, there is a sense in which it is simply false to attribute any 
probability to an outcome since all outcomes do in fact transpire, with probability 1. This 
prima facie problem can be evaded if we do not conceive of the quantum mechanical 
probabilities as pertaining to the sum total of existence, but rather as an experimentalist 
faced with the above set-up asking herself ‘With what probability will I observe ‘spin up’?’. 
Given that there are two possible outcomes and hence two post-measurement worlds, and 
given that the particle will be in a spin-up state in one of these worlds, following the 
principle of indifference it seems reasonable to say that the relevant probability is 0.5. It’s an 
easy matter to extrapolate the probability of any of the possible combinations of outcomes 
for the case of many repeated measurements on identically prepared systems. As Putnam 
notes, it is just “simple combinatorics” (630). And it turns out that quantum mechanics is in 
perfect agreement with this way of calculating the probabilities. 
 
So far, so good. But there is a second, much deeper problem. Just how serendipitous the 
previous case was can be seen if we now suppose that the outcomes of some measurements 
                                                
20 ‘Tiny’ doesn’t quite capture just how minuscule that part will be: Ghirardi 
(2011, §12) estimates that for a regular spherical ball of a mass of 1kg and a 
radius r, the mass that will be found outside a spherical region around the 
center of the ball with radius r + 10-5 cm after the localization is of the order of 
1 over 10 to the power of 1015 times the mass of a proton.  
21 For an introduction to many-worlds interpretations, cf. Vaidman 2014. 
22 Or into n worlds if there are n possible measurement outcomes. For a more 
contemporary take on many-worlds interpretations, cf. Wallace 2012.  
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are not equiprobable, as they were above, but instead heavily biased toward one outcome. 
Say ‘spin up’ is much more likely than ‘spin down’. The combinatorial probabilities will be 
the same as above, with a run of ‘spin up’ just as probable as an equally long run of ‘spin 
down’. But this time, quantum mechanics will give very different probabilities, with a run of 
‘spin up’ coming out as much more probable than an equally long run of ‘spin down’. The 
experimenters in any world in which mostly ‘spin up’ was measured will correctly conclude 
that ‘spin up’ was much more likely and will see, suppose, quantum mechanics corroborated. 
However, the equally many experimenters in the equally many worlds of mostly ‘spin down’ 
will find the quantum-mechanical probabilities disconfirmed. Putnam then rightly asks how 
come we have been so incredibly lucky as to always have found the quantum-mechanical 
probabilities borne out in our world? In fact, on this interpretation, Putnam quips, quantum 
mechanics would be “the first physical theory to predict that the observations of most 
observers will disconfirm the theory.” (630; emphasis in original) Thus, many-worlds 
interpretations are empirically incoherent in that their truth would undermine any 
(empirical) reason we could have to believe the theory to be true. On these grounds, Putnam 
rejects as incoherent solutions to the measurement problem in this family. 
 
This is not the place to defend many-worlds theories against this charge. It should be noted, 
however, that whether they are empirically incoherent in the sense just stated and—if so—
they can recover Born’s rule is a highly controversial matter and remains, as far as I am 
concerned, very much an open question.23  
 
There is another—minor, but routinely misstated—point over which I would like my dissent 
recorded. Putnam writes that the many-worlds interpretations “give up the distinction 
between actuality and possibility” (630).24 They do not: once we are careful to distinguish 
between the possibilities sanctioned by quantum mechanics and those not so sanctioned, we 
recognize that many-worlds interpretations give us no ground to deny non-actual 
possibilities—worlds, perhaps, in which the Schrödinger equation does not govern the 
dynamical evolution of physical systems, or worlds in which there are no physical systems 
at all. So while quantum-mechanical possibilities are indeed rendered actual in many-worlds 
interpretations, one would think that many other possible worlds remain non-actual. Based 
on what follows—endashed—right after the words cited earlier in this paragraph, I am 
confident that Putnam would not object to my petty remark here. But I nevertheless take this 
opportunity to remind the reader of this commonly overlooked fact.  
 
In sum, these considerations move Putnam to conclude as follows: 
 
“What we are left with, if what I have said so far is right, is a conclusion that I initially 
found very distressing: either GRW or some successor, or else Bohm or some 
successor, is the correct interpretation—or... we will just fail to find a scientific realist 
interpretation which is acceptable.” (631; emphasis in original) 
 
Modulo my more hopeful assessment of many-worlds interpretations above, why would one 
                                                
23 For some recent skirmishes in this ongoing debate, cf. Saunders et al. 2010. 
24 This suggestion perhaps goes back to the subtitle of DeWitt 1970.  
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take such a conclusion to be distressing? Putnam’s disquiet arises from the fact that for both 
GRW and Bohmian mechanics, there exist at best some ansätze for how to turn these non-
relativistic theories into fully Lorentz-invariant theories consistent with special relativity. At 
worst, as Putnam reaffirms (631) an earlier argument by Maudlin, none of these theories can 
ever be made fully Lorentz-invariant in that they rely, necessarily, on an ‘absolute’ time. If 
that were the case—that the only defensible solutions to the measurement problem must, by 
necessity, violate Lorentz-invariance and thus contradict relativity—, then that would indeed 
be distressing. For how could we then ever hope to achieve a unification in fundamental 
physics, i.e., to reconcile quantum physics with relativity theory, if the two families of 
theories stood some irreconcilable distance apart? Naturally, philosophers of science in the 
‘disunitist’ camp, such as Cartwright, would hardly be fazed at the prospect of a 
fundamentally “dappled” world. But this is not the place to contribute to the debate between 
‘unitists’ and ‘disunitists’, and so I will simply here grant that the coherence of fundamental 
physics demands a relaxed relationship between quantum physics and relativity theory. 
Incidentally, as a ‘unitist’, I believe that the reconciliation between the two is absolutely 
necessary and arguably the biggest outstanding challenge in fundamental physics. So I feel 
Putnam’s distress.  
 
Putnam’s own—as he admits, speculative—resolution of the tension trades on a particular 
understanding of quantum cosmology, which, in his view, already contains an absolute time 
(632). His idea seems to be something like the following. First, in quantum cosmology, it is 
full spacetimes that have quantum states, and these quantum states “represent different 
geometries of space-time” (ibid.; emphasis in original). Presumably, this means that the 
relevant Hilbert space possesses a basis whose elements can be interpreted as eigenstates of 
operators that capture classical geometrical properties such as areas and volumes.25 Putnam 
reassures us that 
 
[i]t might be that, before we ‘superimpose’, each space-time is perfectly Einsteinian—
each space-time is a Minkowski space-time which knows nothing about any 
‘simultaneity’. (ibid.; emphasis in original) 
 
So suppose it were indeed the case that each eigenstate, in an effort to appease the conflict 
between the quantum and relativity, would contain absolutely no structure that would permit 
the introduction of some absolute time. So where could absolute time come from? Since 
quantum cosmology is a quantum theory, and hence the superposition principle applies, the 
permissible states of the physical system will generally be some superposition of the 
‘geometrical’ eigenstates. This is where Putnam’s most speculative leap occurs: 
 
In effect, one superimposes whole space-times. And this superposition of space-times 
evolves in the background time… [This] would mean that, although Einstein would 
have to admit that there is such a thing as simultaneity, it comes from ‘outside’ any 
one well-defined space-time, it comes from the quantum mechanical ‘interference’ 
between whole space-times. (ibid.) 
 
                                                
25 For a discussion of what that could mean, cf. Wüthrich 2014. 
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Putnam seems to operate on an understanding of what quantum superpositions are that 
presupposes them to be situated at some specific ‘external time’ in which they then evolve. 
Somehow, if we are no longer confined to the well-behaved geometric eigenstates, we must 
accept that there exists a time external to spacetime and that quantum spacetimes can evolve 
in them and thus be in different states at different (external) times. Apart from the fact that it 
conjures up all those ‘one-second-per-second’ objections against multiple layers of time, I 
honestly cannot make sense of the picture that Putnam sketches here. The physical time in 
which any measureable physical processes transpire is the one frozen up in relativistic 
spacetimes. This strongly suggests that superpositions of quantum spacetimes require a 
rather different gloss from the one we standardly gave in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. 
I submit that the gloss with which we don superpositions in quantum cosmology and 
quantum gravity must be entirely ridden free of spatiotemporal undertones.26 If I am right, 
then the tension between solutions to the measurement problem and relativistic demands on 
a fundamental theory would leave us in even greater distress than Putnam admits. 
 
 
4 In conclusion 
 
In this essay, I have defended the following four theses. First, against Cartwright, I have 
argued that Putnam’s 1962 work on theoretical terms is compatible with his claim that 
quantum mechanics needs an interpretation. This need arises from my second—and 
altogether unoriginal—thesis that there is a measurement problem in quantum mechanics. 
Third, I largely agree with Putnam’s own conclusions of 2005, except that I judge Everettian 
many-worlds theories to be more promising than he does and that I think that the apparent 
need of GRW and Bohmian mechanics of an absolute background time to be more 
unsettling than he does.  
 
Fourth, as seems befitting for an essay in a collection celebrating his work, let me close by 
emphasizing just how instrumental Putnam was in convincing both philosophers and 
physicists that there is something rotten in the state of Copenhagen, and of quantum 
mechanics more widely. By the 1960s, most of the people working in fundamental physics 
had turned away from the foundational problems of quantum mechanics in favor of 
articulating the emerging standard model of particle physics—work that yielded more 
immediate results and benefits. Only a few intrepid souls such as John S Bell, Abner 
Shimony, and Hilary Putnam stubbornly continued to puzzle over these ‘philosophical’ 
problems at the heart of non-relativistic quantum mechanics that appeared increasingly 
quaint to so many others. Today, particularly as our attempts to incorporate gravity into a 
unified physical theory have so far led to few breakthroughs, most philosophers and many 
physicists recognize that there remains a central foundational problem that requires our 
attention. Putnam played an important role in getting us from there to here.  
 
Let me illustrate this last point by retelling an episode Putnam relates. Here it is:  
 
                                                
26 For a discussion, cf., once again, Wüthrich 2014. In Wüthrich 2010, I argue 
that other attempts to reintroduce absolute time in quantum gravity fail.  
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In 1962 I had a series of conversations with a world-famous physicist (whom I will not 
identify by name). At the beginning, he insisted, ‘You philosophers just think there is a 
problem with understanding quantum mechanics. We physicists have known better 
from Bohr on.’[suppressed footnote] After I forget how many discussions, we were 
sitting in a bar in Cambridge [(MA)], and he said to me, ‘You’re right. You’ve 
convinced me there is a problem here; it’s a shame I can’t take three months off and 
solve it.’ 
 
Fourteen years later [(1976)], the same physicist and I were together at a conference 
for a few days, and he opened his lecture at that conference (a lecture which explained 
to a general audience the exciting new theories of quarks) by saying, ‘There is no 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Bohr brainwashed a generation of 
physicists.’ Evidently, he had undergone a considerable change of outlook. (2005, 
619; emphasis in original) 
 
I shall be less considerate than Putnam and frankly name the mystery physicist. As anyone 
with a web browser at their fingertip can find out, the mentioned conference was the 1976 
Nobel Conference at Gustavus Adolphus College in Saint Peter, Minnesota, on “the nature 
of the physical universe”, held in honor of Murray Gell-Mann, who had in 1969 won a 
Nobel Prize “for his contributions and discoveries concerning the classification of 
elementary particles and their interactions”.27 Why I am so confident that I correctly 
identified the conference and the physicist, you ask? Well, let me quote Gell-Mann from the 
proceedings of that conference: 
 
… Niels Bohr brainwashed the whole generation of theorists into thinking that the job 
was done 50 years ago. (1979, 29) 
 
Questions of identity aside, the story exemplifies how decisive a factor Putnam was in 
changing people’s mind about the status of the measurement problem in the foundations of 
quantum mechanics, thereby illustrating my fourth thesis.  
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